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 Abstract:  We build a New Keynesian model of the business cycle with sticky prices 
and real wage rigidities motivated by efficiency wages of the gift exchange variety. 
Compared to a standard sticky price model, our Fair Wage model provides an 
explanation for structural unemployment and generates more plausible labor market 
dynamics – notably accounting for the low correlation between wages and 
employment. The fair wage induced real wage rigidity also significantly reduces the 
elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. The smoother dynamics of real 
marginal cost increase both amplification and persistence of output responses to 
monetary shocks, thus remedying the well-known lack of internal propagation of 
standard sticky price models. We take these improvements as a strong endorsement 
of the addition of real wage rigidities to nominal price rigidities and conclude that the 
fair wage extension of this paper constitutes a promising platform for an enriched 
New Keynesian synthesis. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The gap between most dynamic models of the business cycle and economic reality is arguably
largest in the labor market. In standard models, the labor market is described in Walrasian
terms: wages adjust rapidly to economic events because they are competitive spot market prices;
households are always on their labor supply schedules; and unemployment is absent. In reality, wage
determination is more complicated, wages are sluggish and unemployment is a pervasive feature of
modern industrial economies. The Walrasian view of the labor market was originally incorporated
into equilibrium models of the business cycle in the 1970s;1 was taken into real business cycle (RBC)
models in the 1980s;2 and is nearly omnipresent in stochastic general equilibrium models featuring
sticky prices and imperfect competition as they have been developed in the 1990s (sometimes
labeled models of the ”New Neoclassical Synthesis” (NNS)).3 Yet many studies have documented
that each of these strands of research implies labor market dynamics that are sharply at variance
with key stylized facts of modern economies.4
In this paper, we propose a New Keynesian sticky price model that features a very diﬀerent
vision of the labor market, based on the ”partial gift exchange” eﬃciency wage theory introduced
by Akerlof (1982). The central idea behind partial gift exchange is that workers dislike providing
eﬀort. They will, however, work harder than some required minimum (the gift by workers) in
exchange for a real wage above some reference compensation level that is considered as ”fair” (the
gift by the ﬁrm). In such a context, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it optimal to pay a real wage that exceeds the
market-clearing level, therefore inducing structural unemployment. They may also be skeptical of
large wage changes because of the potentially important eﬀects on worker morale and consequently
on the level of eﬀort provided. In response to external shocks, ﬁrms are thus inclined to adjust their
labor input by hiring additional workers from the ”reserve army” of the unemployed rather than
asking their existing employees to increase their work hours in return for a higher hourly wage.
The gift exchange view of labor relations is largely motivated by behavioral considerations about
fairness and reciprocity. Such considerations have recently obtained important empirical support
from a host of evidence in micro surveys and experimental studies documenting that workers often
reciprocate extra pay with extra eﬀort even when no quid pro quo is explicitly required (see Fehr
1See Lucas (1979), Sargent (1976) and Barro (1981).
2See Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983) or King, Plosser and Rebello (1988).
3See Goodfriend and King (1997).
4Besides their failure to accommodate structural unemployment, most of these models have diﬃculties replicating
the low correlation between real wages and employment, the high variability and procyclicality of employment and
the low variability and relative acyclicality of real wages that one ﬁnds in the data. See for example King and Watson
(1996) in the context of a standard sticky price model or King and Rebelo (2000) in the RBC context. Also see Hall
(1999) for a general survey on the deﬁciences of models with frictionless labor markets and on the importance of
taking into account of unemployment to arrive at a realistic description of the business cycle.
2and G¨ achter, 2001, Howitt, 2002, or Bewley, 2002 for surveys). The fair wage idea was ﬁrst intro-
duced in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) context by Danthine and Donaldson
(1990). Within the conﬁnes of a RBC model, these authors ﬁnd that if the reference compensation
level includes contemporaneous variables only, fair wage labor market frictions generate structural
unemployment but do not translate into equilibrium wage sluggishness and therefore cannot resolve
the wage-employment puzzle.5 Kiley (1997) is similarly negative in his assessment about the poten-
tial of the eﬀort eﬃciency wage story. In his stylized framework, acyclical real wages (in line with
the data) require countercyclical eﬀort, thus inducing a highly volatile and procyclical real marginal
cost and preventing any strengthening of the internal propagation mechanism of the model. More
recently however, Collard and de la Croix (2000) have shown, in a RBC model context, that if the
reference compensation level of the eﬀort function not only consists of contemporaneous variables
but also includes comparisons between current and past compensation levels, acyclical real wages
can coexist with cyclical or even procyclical eﬀort. This intertemporal view of eﬀort determination
is supported by survey results of Bewley (1998) who argues that ”...[Akerlof’s model] is correct in
emphasizing morale, and errs only if importance is attached to wage levels rather than to changes
in them.”
We consider a generalized version of the intertemporal gift exchange formulation by Collard and
de la Croix and incorporate it into a standard DSGE framework with monopolistic competition in
the goods market and infrequent price adjustment by ﬁrms along the lines of Calvo (1983). Thus
we provide an answer to the call by Romer (1993) and others for combining labor market rigidities
with sticky prices.
The implications of our gift exchange addition are striking. Estimation of the fair wage function
derived from the model for quarterly U.S. data between 1953 and 2001 supports the view that ﬁrms
are highly reluctant to change wages. Our model rationalizes this result as the consequence of ﬁrms
taking into account the excessive eﬀects large wage changes would have on workers’ morale (and
consequently on the level of eﬀort). We evaluate the dynamic eﬀects of the estimated fair wage
function on the economy by comparing a variety of impulse response functions and unconditional
moments for our Fair Wage model with the data as well as with a benchmark NNS sticky price
model (without labor market frictions). Four results stand out on the labor market side. First, our
Fair Wage model generates structural unemployment; second, it implies a form of real wage rigidity
that permits replicating the near-zero correlation between the real wage and employment in the
data; third, it substantially reduces the variability and procyclicality of real wages; and fourth, it
5The reason for this result is that while employers indeed tend to be cautious when adjusting wages in response to
shocks (because doing so would aﬀect workers’ morale and eﬀort level and could thus cost more than it would save),
it remains optimal in equilibrium to adjust wages as the incentive eﬀect of variations in unemployment more than
compensates for the morale eﬀect of wage changes.
3makes employment both more procyclical and more variable. The intertemporal view of fair wage
considerations in the labor market therefore oﬀers an explanation for why real wages are not only
rigid in the sense of preventing labor market clearance but also sluggish in their adjusting to new
economic conditions.
Moreover, our Fair Wage model leads to markedly ampliﬁed and more persistent responses of
output to monetary shocks. This ﬁnding is of special interest because NNS models with nominal
rigidity in prices alone have been faulted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) or Huang and Liu
(2002) for their weak propagation mechanism. These authors have demonstrated that under plau-
sible assumptions about the degree of price ﬁxity, the elasticity of labor supply and intertemporal
links in the economy, the impact of monetary shocks on output remains limited and of insuﬃ-
cient duration. The lack of internal propagation can be traced to the fact that, in these models,
marginal cost is extremely sensitive to changes in output. As a result, the price changes of ﬁrms
adjusting to aggregate demand shocks is large despite their knowing that a certain number of their
competitors keep their prices constant. By contrast, real wage rigidity as introduced by our Fair
Wage mechanism makes real wages and thus real marginal cost much less sensitive to variations in
aggregate output. Smaller variations in marginal cost lead ﬁrms to make smaller price adjustments
and to increase their output response. As a result, the response of aggregate output to aggregate
demand shocks is ampliﬁed and more persistent and the time-series properties of output and prices
generated by the Fair Wage model are more in line with business cycle observations. In addition
of being consistent with more plausible labor market characteristics, our Fair Wage model thus
appears to resolve one of the principal defect of New Keynesian sticky price models.
We are not the ﬁrst to reach the conclusion that real rigidities substantially enhance the per-
formance of DSGE models with nominal rigidities.6 In fact, we join a growing strand of literature
anticipated by Jeanne (1998). Jeanne studied an abbreviated NNS sticky price model with a
reduced-form wage equation. He found that real rigidities lead to more persistent output ﬂuctua-
tions in response to a monetary shock. However, his real wage rigidity was not motivated by an
explicit underlying theory. Closer to the present study and more structurally explicit than Jeanne
are models combining sticky prices with (exogenously imposed) staggered nominal wage contracts
(Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) and others); with eﬃciency wage of the shirking variety
(Alexopoulos, 2001 or Felices, 2002); or with search and matching frictions (for example Walsh,
6An alternative remedy to the excess sensitivity of marginal cost has been proposed by Dotsey and King (2001) who
supplement a standard NNS model with variable capital utilization, produced intermediate inputs and employment
variations on the extensive margin. These real (quantity) ﬂexibilities lead to smaller factor price ﬂuctuations, thus
dampening the response of real marginal cost to aggregate demand ﬂuctuations and generating ampliﬁed and more
persistent output responses. The present paper exploits the alternative route consisting of augmenting the NNS
framework with ”real (wage) rigidities”, i.e. labor market frictions limiting the adjustment of real wages after an
external shock.
42002). Section 6 of the present paper undertakes some limited comparisons of the empirical predic-
tions of our model and of some of the just cited competitors. While it is, in our view, premature
to single out one form of real frictions over all others, our fair wage approach compares well with
the alternatives. Besides displaying dynamic properties that are in line with the data on many ac-
counts, the fair wage concept also has the advantage of being well supported by micro evidence and
of giving rise to a relatively parsimonious form of modelling. An important additional distinction in
light of available evidence (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) is that the intertemporal wage comparisons of
our fair wage construct provide a natural rationalization for the presence of backward-looking fea-
tures in the wage equation, and thus indirectly in the price equations of the reduced form solution
to the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our Fair Wage model. Section
3 summarizes the calibration of the model parameters and documents the estimation of the fair
wage function. The performance of the model is evaluated in Section 4, while Section 5 checks the
robustness of our results with respect to changes in the calibration. Finally, Section 6 contrasts our
results to other studies that introduce rigidities in the labor market and Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The proposed fair wage model contains the standard elements of a NNS model such as described
by Goodfriend and King (1997) but is amended with a partial gift exchange eﬀort component. The
model is populated by three types of agents, which we will describe in turn: families of consumer-
workers, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms and a monetary authority.
2.1 Families and individuals
Preferences and eﬀort decisions. Our fair wage economy is inhabited by a [0-1] continuum of
families, each composed of a [0-1] continuum of inﬁnitely-lived individual family members. Fami-
lies are assumed to make all key intertemporal decisions and to redistribute consumption equally
among its members. Hence, individuals are identical ex-ante. However, they diﬀer ex-post in
that some of them are unemployed while the others are working (we assume random, costless and
time-independent matching with ﬁrms). Families remain identical ex-post in that employment is
randomly allocated among workers and that the fraction of unemployed members is the same across
families.7
Individuals have preferences over consumption and eﬀort, but not leisure. This implies that in
each period, every consumer-worker inelastically supplies one unit of time for work (or unemploy-
ment related activities) and that the traditional consumption-leisure trade-oﬀ is absent from our
7See Alexopoulos (2001) for the use of a similar construct.




βt [logct − ntG(et)] , (1)
where E is the expectations operator, β is the discount factor, ct is the aggregate family consumption
at date t, nt is the fraction of family members working at date t and G(et) is the disutility of eﬀort
of the typical working family member.8
Eﬀort is assumed to be determined by fairness considerations along the lines of the partial
gift-exchange idea of Akerlof (1982). Speciﬁcally, workers dislike eﬀorts but they are willing to
provide some eﬀort beyond some norm to the extent that they feel well treated by their employer.
Extra eﬀort (the gift by the worker) thus comes in exchange for a remuneration wt that exceeds
some reference compensation level (the gift of the ﬁrm). This reference level has traditionally been
interpreted as summarizing what a given employed worker would receive were she not employed
by her current employer. Such a deﬁnition includes the wage paid by other ﬁrms in the economy,
a measure of the current (un-)employment situation (representing the probability of being hired
by another employer), and possibly a measure of unemployment compensation.This formulation
is strongly supported by empirical evidence from Bewley’s (1998) survey study, with the added
qualifyer that changes in compensation from one period to the next appear to be key in explaining
motivation and eﬀort. Following Collard and de la Croix (2000), we therefore include individual
past real wage wt−1(j) as another determinant of eﬀort and — anticipating the log-linear form of
our model to be imposed later — express worker j’s eﬀort function G(et(j)) as9
G(et(j)) = (et(j) − (φ0 + φ1 logwt(j)+φ2 lognt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logwt−1(j)))
2 ,
where et(j), wt(j)a n dwt−1(j)s t a n df o rindividual j’s current eﬀort and her current and last
period’s real wage level, respectively; while wt and nt represent the aggregate real wage and em-
ployment level in the economy, respectively.
The speciﬁcation of preferences in (1) implies that consumption and eﬀort considerations are sep-
arable. The supply of eﬀort is thus wealth-independent, hence optimal eﬀort et(j)f o ra ne m p l o y e d
individual j given wt(j), wt−1(j), wt and nt (all of which the individual considers as exogenous by
assumption) satisﬁes
et(j)=φ0 + φ1 logwt(j)+φ2 lognt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logwt−1(j). (2)
8The consumption part of the period utility function could, with no consequences, be written as
R 1
0 logct(j)dj,
thus permitting a strict interpretation of the family utility as the equally weighted sum of its members’ utilities
9One could imagine including higher-order lags of the individual’s real wage in (2). We examine this issue in
Section 3 where we estimate the parameters of the eﬀort function.
6A priori, we expect that eﬀort depends positively on the individual’s current real wage (φ1 > 0)
but negatively on the current aggregate compensation level, the tightness of the labor market and
the individual’s past real wage (φ2 < 0, φ3 < 0, φ4 < 0). Intuition also suggests that φ1 + φ3 > 0.
That is, the positive incentive eﬀect of a larger own wage is stronger than the negative eﬀect of a
higher comparison wage. The selection of the various parameter values is, however, an empirical
matter that we address in Section 3.
Our eﬀort function (2) represents a generalization of the eﬀort functions proposed in the rep-
resentative agent context by Danthine and Donaldson (1990) and Collard and de la Croix (2000).
In particular, Collard and de la Croix specify et(j)=φ + γ log[wt(j)/(wtnt)] + ψlog[wt(j)/wt−1],
which is almost equivalent to (2). We diﬀer in that their eﬀort function imposes the restrictions
φ1 = γ+ψ > 0, φ2 = φ3 = −γ < 0a n dφ4 = −ψ < 0. These restrictions will be tested in Section 3.
In addition, eﬀort et(j) in our setup depends, in principle, on individual j’s past real wage wt−1(j)
rather than on the economy-wide real wage wt−1.10
It may be noted that the present set-up is observationally equivalent to one where families are
abstracted from. In that alternative framework, adopted among others by Danthine and Donaldson
(1990) and Collard and de la Croix (2000), workers themselves make the intertemporal decisions
and inelastically supply one unit of labor. To bypass the problem of ex-post heterogeneity due to
the fact that workers will be either employed or unemployed, the authors assume the existence of
perfect insurance contracts. Risk averse workers choose to perfectly insure themselves against the
risk of being unemployed, thus restoring ex-post homogeneity.11
Cash-in-advance and budget constraints. Savings is decided at the family level. It takes
the form of either monetary or non-monetary, interest-bearing assets. Money is by deﬁnition a
dominated asset but positive holdings are motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint applying to
both consumption ct and investment it;i . e .
at ≥ ct + it ,( 3 )
with at representing real monetary assets at the beginning of period t. It consists of end of last





+ tt ,( 4 )
10Assuming that individual eﬀort is a function of the individual’s past wage is arguably more reasonable. For
tractability, we will however invoke a special case that allows replacing wt−1(j)withwt−1.
11In our framework, since the eﬀort function always peaks at zero, the family compact also corresponds to an
optimal insurance contract and the unemployed are no better or worse oﬀ than the employed. In both set ups, it is
assumed that the existence of these insurance payments does not aﬀect the attitude of workers with respect to their
employer, i.e., their perception of the gift of the ﬁrm.
7where πt = Pt/Pt−1 stands for the gross rate of inﬂation between t−1a n dt based on an aggregate
price index P.
Imposing a CIA constraint on both c and i is logically consistent in a one-good model where
consumer-workers are responsible for consumption and physical investment. Such a modelling choice
is also desirable because, in the absence of utility for leisure or other alternatives to purchasing the
marketed good for consumption, variations in the inﬂation tax would otherwise induce implausible
and systematic distortions in the investment vs. consumption decisions.
Non-monetary savings take the form of investment it into physical capital that is rented to
ﬁrms on a period-by-period basis for a gross real rental rk
t .12 Investment into physical capital is
transformed into usable capital according to
γkt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it ,( 5 )
where δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital, assumed constant over time, and γ denotes the
steady state growth rate of real variables.13 Given these savings and investment alternatives, the
budget constraint for the representative family can be expressed as
mt + ct + it = wt(1 − ut)+rk
t kt + at + qt ,( 6 )
where rk
t kt and qt are capital income and the representative family’s share of ﬁrms’ proﬁts, respec-
tively.
Consumption/savings decision. Maximizing the expected discounted lifetime utility (1)
subject to the constraints (3), (4), (5) and (6) leads to the following combined ﬁrst-order conditions,

















where λt denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint.
Comparison to a basic NNS model. By contrast to our Fair Wage model, the sup-
ply of labor in a basic NNS framework with a Walrasian labor market is variable and depends
12Danthine and Donaldson (2002) are critical of this (standard) way of introducing physical capital in NNS models.
13Following the tradition of the RBC literature, all real aggregates of our model are transformed into stationary
variables by normalizing them with the labor augmenting rate of technological progress and the steady state growth
rate of population. See Appendix A.2 for a detailed explanation of this transformation.
8on the representative agent’s consumption-leisure trade-oﬀ. On the other hand, eﬀort is as-
sumed to be constant and unaﬀected by either the wage level or the employment situation. A
standard way of expressing the expected discounted lifetime utility function of such a model is
U = E0
£P∞
t=0 βt (log(ct)+θlog(1 − nt))
¤
and the eﬀort function (2) is replaced by a Walrasian
labor supply condition of the form
θ
1 − nt
= λtwt.( 9 )
All other ﬁrst-order conditions and the diﬀerent constraints remain the same.
2.2 Firms
Production and cost minimization. Given some demand yt(z), an individual ﬁrm z ∈ [0,1] will




At is a common-to-all ﬁrms productivity shock and α is the capital factor share parameter. This
production function diﬀers from the standard NNS technology insofar as labor nt(z) is augmented
by the level of eﬀort et(z), which is uniformly supplied by the employed workers. Firm z therefore





s.t. yt(z) ≤ Atkt(z)α [et(z)nt(z)]
1−α
et(z)=φ0 + φ1 logwt(z)+φ2 lognt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logwt−1.
Note that we have replaced the individual’s past wage in the eﬀort function with the aggregate past
wage wt−1. This can be interpreted as anticipating the fact that in equilibrium all ﬁrms will pay
identical wages. It is also in line with the implicit assumption of a high worker mobility economy
where ﬁrms face a random sample of new workers in each period, with the typical worker’s past
wage corresponding to the economy’s last period average. Under this assumption, ﬁrms also ignore
the impact a higher wage oﬀer today has on future eﬀort, i.e. they treat wt−1 as an externality. In
Becker’s (1996) terminology, this is the so-called social norm case.15
14Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that ﬁrms always ﬁnd it optimal to meet demand yt(z).
15The arguably more realistic alternative — the personal norm case — assumes that ﬁrms internalize the negative
inﬂuence that a higher wage has on future eﬀort. In such an environment, ﬁrms would have to keep track of the
distribution of past wages of the individuals that they employ in the current and future periods. Solving for the
personal norm case involves analyzing the distribution of wages and its dependency on price setting, a non-trivial
task we leave for further work.
















where mct(z) denotes ﬁrm z’s period t real marginal cost — corresponding to the Lagrangian mul-
tiplier for the output constraint.






Firms in the social norm case of our model thus ﬁnd it optimal to set wages so as to elicit a constant
level of eﬀort.16 Substituting this condition into the eﬀort function, we can derive the so-called fair
wage function, i.e. the wage level consistent with the optimal level of eﬀort et = φ1
logwt(z)=( 1− φ0/φ1) − φ2/φ1 lognt − φ3/φ2 logwt − φ4/φ1 logwt−1.
The real wage wt(z) is seen to entirely depend on factors that the ﬁrm considers exogenous. There-











This important equation highlights that aggregate real wage dynamics in our Fair Wage model are
a function of aggregate employment and last period’s aggregate real wage. We will rely on (15) for
the calibration of the parameters of the eﬀort function.17
Optimal price setting. Following Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Rotemberg (1987), we








16Collard and de la Croix consider the personal norm case under the hybrid assumption that individual eﬀort does
not depend on the individual’s past wage but rather on the economy-wide average past wage. They ﬁnd that in such
ac a s e ,e ﬀort becomes procyclical.
17Note that our model nests an alternative view of eﬃciency wages where eﬀort depends on the absolute real wage
level and not on relative wage comparisons. Our estimation of the fair wage function in Section 3 will inform to what
extent this alternative is relevant in the data.
10The ratio Pt(z)/Pt denotes ﬁrm z’s price relative to the aggregate price index Pt, µ>1i st h e
constant elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent goods, and yt is an aggregate demand





As for price setting, we adopt Calvo’s (1983) partial adjustment mechanism on the grounds
that it leads to a particularly tractable pricing relationship and that it has been used extensively
in previous literature.18 Accordingly, there is an (unspeciﬁed) source of nominal rigidity that is
approximated by assuming that, in any given time period, the typical ﬁrm faces the constant
probability κ of keeping its price constant and the complementary probability (1−κ) of being free
to adjust.19 Given this setup, the average duration of price ﬁxity can be derived as 1/(1 − κ).
A ﬁrm that does adjust in period tsets its new optimal price Pt(z)s oa st om a x i m i z et h e






In this expression, qt+j,t(z) stands for the period t + j real proﬁt conditional on ﬁrm z not having
adjusted its price after t, βjEt(λt+j/λt)represents the expected discount factor with which share-
holders (i.e. the consumer-workers) value date t+j proﬁts and κj denotes the probability that the
ﬁrm in question will keep its new price Pt(z) unchanged from t through t+j.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t




(βκ)jEt [log(mct+j(z)/mc(z)) + logPt+j], (17)
where (mct+j(z)/mc(z)) is the period t + j aggregate real marginal cost of ﬁrm z relative to its
steady state value. Condition (17) highlights that ﬁrm z’s new optimal price is entirely determined
by expectations about future real marginal costs and future aggregate prices, and by the probability
κj that the ﬁrm will keep its new price unchanged for j periods.
¿From the above exposition, we also know that all ﬁrms face the same constant return to
scale production function and charge the same factor prices wt and rk
t (by assumption, ﬁrms are
price takers in the capital market). As a consequence, marginal cost is the same for all ﬁrms,
mct(z)=mct, which in turn implies that every adjusting ﬁrm charges the same new optimal price
18See for example King and Wolman (1996), Yun (1996), Woodford (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
McCallum and Nelson (1998) or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998).
19The assumption of a ﬁxed probability of changing prices regardless of the number of periods since the last
adjustment is admittedly a simpliﬁcation. Recent work by Kiley (2002) and Wolman (1999) suggests that the price
dynamics implied by a DSGE model with more realistic adjustment processes may diﬀer substantially from a DSGE
model with Calvo pricing. Investigating the impact of alternative pricing mechanism on our Fair Wage model is left
for future research.
20See for example King and Wolman (1996) or Wolman (1999).
11Pt(z)=P∗
t regardless of its pricing history. This implication allows us to express the law of motion
for the aggregate price index as:
logPt =( 1− κ)logP∗
t + κlogPt−1. (18)
Real wage rigidity and the eﬀects on real marginal cost and the labor market.
Equation (15) highlights the dependence of current on past real wages in our Fair Wage model. Such
an intertemporal link has the potential to decrease the sensitivity of real wages and real marginal
cost to output ﬂuctuations, thus providing the internal propagation mechanism that Romer (1993)
and others emphasize as being crucial for small nominal price rigidities to have sizable real eﬀects.
To illustrate this point, combine the cost-minimizing conditions (11) and (12) with the production
function (10) and the Solow condition. Real marginal cost can then be written as
log(mct/mc)=αlog(rk
t /rk)+( 1− α)log(wt/w) − log(At/A),
where variables without time subscripts designate steady state values. Everything else constant, if
real wages turn out to be suﬃciently rigid (a property that would arise in our context because of
the dependence of current wages on past wages), the sensitivity of real marginal cost with respect
to output is lower. In turn, the optimal price setting equation (17) implies that a decreased
responsiveness of real marginal cost induces adjusting ﬁrms to make smaller and more gradual
price changes, thus leading to larger and more persistent output responses to exogenous shocks.
Of course, a crucial issue is the extent to which the output elasticity of rk is altered by changes
in the degree of real wage rigidity. In other words, greater real wage rigidity only leads to less
responsive real marginal cost dynamics if it is not oﬀset by an increase in the sensitivity of the
rental rate of capital. Whether this is the case or not may well depend on the model context and
its parametrization. We return to this question in Sections 4 and 5.
Compared to the basic NNS model, our Fair Wage framework carries with it a non-trivial
change in the interpretation of employment ﬂuctuations. This is because the representative ﬁrm
z hires nt(z) workers, each of them inelastically supplying one unit of labor, subject to the labor
demand condition (12) and the fair wage function (15). Aggregate employment then simply equals
nt =
R 1
0 nt(z)dz and nothing guarantees that in equilibrium, all workers are eﬀectively hired. Hence,
there is a clear sense in which there is unemployment at the equilibrium of our Fair Wage model
with the unemployment rate being deﬁned as
ut =1− nt.
Furthermore, under the hypothesis that all individuals work full time or not at all, the employment
level nt is interpreted as the fraction of consumer-workers employed and all employment ﬂuctuations
12can be viewed as movements on the extensive margin. By contrast, all labor market ﬂuctuations in
the basic NNS model happen on the intensive margin and equilibrium employment is determined
by the intersection of the labor supply condition (9) and the labor demand equation (12). Since
eﬀort is constant by assumption and real wages always adjust to clear the market, there is no
unemployment.21
2.3 Money supply
Monetary authorities exogenously set the (net) growth rate of money ηt, such that the supply of





The seigniorage from this money growth is redistributed lump-sum to consumer-workers yielding





2.4 Aggregation and equilibrium
In equilibrium, all money available will be used for consumption and investment. Thus,
mt = at = ct + it . (21)









where the alternative price index ¯ Pt is deﬁned as
¯ P
−µ
t =( 1− κ)P
∗−µ
t + κ ¯ P
−µ
t−1. (23)
21We stress, however, that, in the Fair Wage model, the indivisibility assumption does not play any role in generating
a larger intertemporal substitution in leisure and labor as is the case in the Rogerson-Hansen indivisible labor model.
This is why we consider the standard NNS model without indivisibility as the relevant benchmark in our analysis.
Indeed, our family construct guarantees that the decision making unit is not aﬀected by the interpretation that
individuals work full time or not at all, and nothing substantive or quantitative depends on this interpretation.
Rather, it is the existence of involuntary unemployment resulting from eﬃciency wages that is key in generating a
high responsiveness of employment or hours to exogeneous shocks.








Finally, combining the representative budget constraint (6) with the ﬁrm cost minimization
conditions (11) and (12), the equilibrium real balances condition (21) and the proﬁt function (24),
we obtain the national income identity
yt = ct + it. (25)
The dynamics of the Fair Wage model are described by the system of equations (4), (5), (7),
(8), (11), (12), (15) and (17) — (25). The system of equations corresponding to the dynamics of the
standard NNS models is the same with the exception that the fair wage function (15) is replaced
by the labor supply condition (9). We solve the model with the numerical mechanism developed
by King and Watson (1998) after log-linearizing all equations.22
3 Parametrization and exogenous driving processes
3.1 Calibration of standard parameters
We choose to calibrate the standard parameters of our Fair wage and benchmark NNS models as
follows:
Calibration of standard parameters
Preferences β =0 .99, µ =1 0 ,θ =1 .51(NNS model only)
Production function α =0 .33
Depreciation rate δ =0 .025
Growth rate of real variables γ =1 .0049
Fraction of price adjusting ﬁrms (1 − κ)=0 .3
Steady state technology and money growth A =1 , η =0
The value for β implies a steady state risk free real interest rate of 6.5%in annualized terms,
while δ =0 .025 leads to an annualized depreciation rate of eﬀective capital of 10%. Both of
these calibrations are standard (King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988). The weight on leisure in the
speciﬁcation of preferences valid for the benchmark NNS model is set to θ =1 .51, resulting in a
steady state fraction of hours worked of one-third (Cooley and Prescott, 1995).
The growth rate of real variables for our sample is estimated to be γ =1 .0049.23 The elasticity
of substitution between goods is set to µ = 10, as suggested by Basu (1996) and Basu and Kimball
22We thank Bob King for providing us with the relevant solution code.
23See Appendix A.2 for details.
14(1997), implying a steady state markup of price over marginal cost of 11%. With this mark-up, a
labor income share of 0.60 — as estimated by Cooley and Prescott (1995) — obtains if the production
function parameter is set to α =0 .33.
Setting the fraction of price adjusting ﬁrms in the Calvo pricing framework (1 − κ)=0 .3l e a d s
to an average price duration of 3.3quarters. This value is within the range of industry-speciﬁc
estimates as summarized by Taylor (1998). Finally, the steady state values of the productivity
shock and the money growth rate are calibrated so as to produce a zero steady-state rate of
inﬂation for our transformed economy. This calibration considerably simpliﬁes the log-linearization
and may be considered as a useful approximation for the analysis of business cycle dynamics.
3.2 Estimation of the fair wage function
As discussed in the previous section, the gift exchange view of labor relations is largely based on
behavioral considerations about fairness and reciprocity. Unfortunately, neither micro surveys nor
experimental studies have produced quantitative estimates of the relevant elasticities permitting
the type of calibration exercise that underlies modern business cycle research. In our view this lack
of precise knowledge about the relative importance of the diﬀerent factors aﬀecting eﬀort does not
mean that we should not submit our model to the usual tests.
The approach we choose to address this challenge is as follows. Instead of attempting to
directly calibrate the structural parameters of the eﬀort function, we observe that, if the view of
the world presented in Section 2 is a good depiction of reality, the interaction of workers’ and ﬁrms’
optimizing behaviors should produce a wage dynamics that is well approximated by the fair wage
function (15). We therefore choose to calibrate (combinations of) the eﬀort parameters indirectly
by estimating the parameters of the fair wage function in two distinct steps.24 First, we set the
constant (φ1−φ0)/(φ1 + φ3) such that the average unemployment rate in our model economy equals
5.63%, which corresponds to the average rate of U.S. unemployment between 1953 and 2001. This
value is substantially lower than the more European level of 10% used in the study by Collard and
de la Croix.25
Second, we determine the elasticities −φ2/(φ1 + φ3)a n d−φ4/(φ1 + φ3) by estimating the fair
wage function without the constant term, using linearly detrended quarterly U.S. data on the real
24We are aware that this calibration approach does not permit recovering all the primitive parameter values of the
eﬀort function. However, we believe that our parameter identiﬁcation occurs suﬃciently ”upstream” for the validity
of the analysis performed in the next section to be assured. Furthermore one should keep in mind that the only
purpose of our estimation is to determine plausible values for the parameters of the fair wage function. In Section 5,
we assess the robustness of our model to alternative calibrations.
25Notice that for our log-linearized solution approach, the choice of steady-state unemployment does not aﬀect the
model dynamics but only the dynamics of unemployment itself.
15wage and employment over the same time period.26 An important concern in this exercise is the
potential for simultaneous equation bias because the explanatory variable lognt is endogenous and
depends, among other things, on the real wage. We circumvent this problem by resorting to a
two-stage-least-square (2SLS) procedure (see Hamilton (1994), chapter 9). The instruments we







with the numbers in parenthesis representing the asymptotic standard errors of the 2SLS approach.
The R2 for this regression is 0.99, indicating a high degree of linear ﬁtw h i l et h eB r e u s c h - G o d f r e y
LM test statistic of 5.55 for 10 lags provides no signiﬁcant evidence against the hypothesis of
uncorrelated errors ²t (p-value of 0.85).
The estimated elasticity with respect to lognt is small but according to a one-sided t-test
signﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 99.6% level. Concurrently, the estimated elasticity with
respect to logwt−1 is much more important and close to unity. However, a one-sided t-test rejects
the hypothesis of a unit value at the 91.1% signiﬁcance level. Conditional on (φ1 + φ3) > 0( t h e
incentive eﬀect of a larger own wage is stronger than the negative eﬀect of a higher comparison
wage), the positive estimates of both elasticities indicates that the data is consistent with our
intuition that both labor market tightness and past compensation levels exert upward pressure on
current real wages. Furthermore, the large estimate on logwt−1 highlights the crucial role past
wages play in the determination of eﬀort, lending indirect empirical support to Bewley’s micro-
based argument that ”...[Solow’s and Akerlof’s fair wage idea] is correct in emphasizing morale,
and errs only if importance is attached to wage levels rather than changes in them.”
The results reported here are also helpful in appreciating the calibration that Collard and de la
Croix choose for their eﬀort function in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e i rp a p e r .T h e yi m p o s e−φ2/(φ1 + φ3)=
γ/ψ =0 .9/2.8=0 .3214 and −φ4/(φ1 + φ3)=ψ/ψ = 1 (the ﬁrst ratio being chosen such that their
RBC model exactly replicates the correlation between output and employment). As our estimates
show, both of these restrictions can be independently rejected at high signiﬁcance levels (the rejec-
tion is also strongly conﬁrmed by a F-test of the joint hypothesis that both restrictions hold). Hence,
while the data attributes great importance to the intertemporal view of eﬀort determination that
Collard and de la Croix emphasize in their work, our results cast serious doubt on their calibration
of the relationship between labor market tightness and the current real wage. Moreover, we reject
the hypothesis of additional lags of the real wage in the eﬀort function (i.e. habit persistence) that
Collard and de la Croix introduce in the second part of their paper. For example, when regressing
26Appendix A.2 explains why linear detrending of the logged variables involved in the estimation of the fair wage
function naturally follows from the stationarity transformation underlying our model.
16the real wage on employment and four lags of the real wage, logwt = c0 lognt+
P4
i=1 ci logwt−i+²t,
we ﬁnd that all but the ﬁrst lag of the real wage are highly insigniﬁcant and a F-test of the null
that the coeﬃcients on all but the ﬁrst lag of the real wage are jointly zero cannot be rejected at
the 95% signiﬁcance level.
3.3 Form and estimation of the driving processes
Two goals underlie the speciﬁcation of the driving processes. On the one hand, we want the driving
processes to match the autocovariance properties of the data counterparts of the technology shock
At and the money growth shock ηt as closely as possible. On the other hand, we intend to keep
our framework as stylized and easily interpretable as possible.
Form. Following the RBC literature, the log of the technology shock is assumed to follow an
AR(1) process:27
log(At)=ρA log(At−1)+εAt . (26)
Similarly, the dynamics of the money growth rate is approximated by:
ηt = ρηηt−1 + εηt . (27)
Furthermore, we specify the two innovations εAt and εηt as a bivariate process (εAt εηt)˜(0,Ω)w i t h
the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix Ω left unrestricted. Thus, we allow for
contemporaneous correlation between the innovations.
Estimation. The series corresponding to the technology shock is constructed by taking logged
data on output and employment, removing a linear trend from each of the series and then computing
logAt =l o gyt − (1 − α)lognt. As in King and Watson (1996), we thus exclude ﬂuctuations of the
capital share because this term has a very small variance and is poorly measured in the data.28
Concurrently, a series for money growth is obtained by approximating the net growth rate ηt by
log(1 + ηt)=l o g ( Mt) − log(Mt−1).
With these two series at hand, we estimate ρA and ρη from (26) and (27) with ordinary least





where ˆ εt =[ ˆ εAt ˆ εηt]0 are the sample residuals of the two regressions. For our sample period, this
leads to the following results:
ˆ ρA ˆ ρη ˆ σA ˆ ση corˆ rA,η
0.96 0.67 2.54 1.12 0.05
27See King and Rebelo (2000) for a discussion.
28Note that this shock process is consistent with the aggregate production function in (22) because in our zero
inﬂation steady-state setup, ¯ Pt/Pt is constant and et = φ1 in equilibrium. Both of these constants are (presumably)
removed from the data when applying the linear trend.
17where σA, ση and corrA,η are the standard deviation of log(A), the standard deviation of η and the
correlation between the two, respectively. The estimates of the autoregressive coeﬃcients and the
standard deviations closely match the empirical evidence reported in other studies (see for example
King and Rebelo (2000) for the values of ρA, σA and Yun (1996) for the values of ρη, ση). We
interpret the estimate corˆ rA,η =0 .05 as an indicator that monetary policy (which is not explicitly
modeled here) has historically been mildly accommodative of real-side supply shocks.
4 Simulation results
The empirical performance of the Fair Wage model is analyzed in two stages. First, we consider
impulse response functions (IRFs) of diﬀerent aggregates with respect to a money growth and a
technology shock. The goal of this exercise is (i) to graphically illustrate the eﬀects of introducing
real wage rigidity; and (ii) to perform a quality check in the sense of Gali (1999) who argued
that reporting unconditional second moments alone may disguise important model deﬁciencies in
terms of responses conditional on a particular shock. In the second stage, we report a variety
of unconditional second moments. Presumably, the evaluation of monetary business cycle models
along this dimension has been stalled by the impossibility to reliably specify the joint behavior of
all the disturbances inﬂuencing the model. While it is certainly true that important assumptions
underlie any calculation of unconditional moments, we argue that these assumptions are no stronger
than the ones taken for the identiﬁcation of structural VARs necessary to quantify the model
performance in terms of IRFs. Furthermore, unconditional moments are an illustrative measure
of performance that allows us to compare the performance of our Fair Wage economy to diﬀerent
models of the RBC type.
4.1 Impulse response functions
IRFs with respect to a money growth shock. F i g u r e1d i s p l a y sI R F so fs e v e r a lk e yv a r i a b l e s
over 20 quarters with respect to a 1% shock in money growth for both the Fair Wage model (solid
lines) and the benchmark NNS model (dotted lines). One cannot fail noticing the weak response
of output — both in terms of ampliﬁcation and persistence — in the NNS economy relative to the
responses for the Fair Wage speciﬁcation. This observation will be conﬁrmed by all the other
empirical performance measures reported in this section. The response of output in the Fair Wage
model peaks after three to four quarters and is roughly twice as large as the maximum output
increase in the NNS case, which occurs after two quarters. Compared to evidence from structural
VARs such as Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), the hump-shape of the output response
is thus slightly too concentrated but the fair wage addition moves the timing of the peak in the
18right direction.29 As to persistence, we borrow Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan’s (2000) contract
multiplier as a useful yardstick.30 Our Fair Wage model yields a contract multiplier of about 6,
w h i c h—f o ro u ra s s u m e da v e r a g ep r i c eﬁxity of 3.3quarters — is roughly equal to the multiplier
that these authors ﬁnd in the data. By contrast, the contract multiplier corresponding to the NNS
model is about 4 or roughly a third lower.
The key to understanding the powerful internal propagation mechanism of the Fair Wage model
is — not surprisingly — the behavior of the real wage. The response of the real wage is much dampened
and more gradual compared to the NNS model (center plot of Figure 1). Since the rental rate of
capital remains virtually unchanged with the exception of a slightly smaller deviation on impact
(not reported for space reasons), the response of real marginal cost is also much smaller and hump-
shaped. This means that adjusting ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to increase their prices to a smaller extent,
which has the consequence that the aggregate price level adjusts more gradually to its new level
while the response of output is both larger and longer-lasting. Finally, the ampliﬁed and persistent
eﬀect on output is naturally matched by larger consumption and investment responses, with the
main eﬀect being on investment because the temporary nature of the shock implies a smooth pattern
for consumption in application of the permanent income hypothesis.
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) recently stressed that insensitive real marginal cost dy-
namics seems indispensable for models with nominal price rigidities and intertemporal links (such
as investment) to generate a plausibly persistent response of output to monetary shocks. The
reported IRFs underline this argument and suggest that our speciﬁcation of eﬀort considerations
oﬀer a plausible mechanism to solve this ”persistence problem”. In this respect, our Fair Wage
model represents an alternative to Dotsey and King’s (2001) introduction of ”real ﬂexibilities” -
i.e. produced inputs, variable capacity utilization, and labor supply variability along the extensive
margin — which also lead to a reduced sensitivity of real marginal cost, reduced price variability
29Strictly speaking, our IRFs cannot be directly compared with the bulk of the structural VAR responses reported in
the literature because most of them identify the monetary shock as an exogenous perturbation to a policy instrument
other than the growth rate of money. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998), however, argue that an AR(1)
representation with a persistence of about 0.5 (which is roughly the same than our estimate) is a good approximation
to the estimated IRF of money growth with respect to an exogenous shock in the monetary policy instrument. Such a
money growth process can therefore be used indirectly as a ”stand-in” monetary policy instrument. At the same time,
IRFs from structural VAR responses are subject to a variety of criticisms on their own (identiﬁcation assumptions,
choice of variables and so forth). Hence, we emphasize that the main goal of our reporting IRFs is not to compare
them with the data but rather to use them as a means of understanding the internal propagation mechanisms of our
model.
30Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan’s contract multiplier is deﬁned as the ratio of the half-life of output after a monetary
shock with nominal price rigidity to the corresponding half-life with ﬂexible prices (with half-life being deﬁned as
the length of time after a shock before the deviation in output shrinks to half of its impact value). Since shocks
o c c u rr a n d o m l yo v e ra n yg i v e np e r i o d ,t h eh a l f - l i f ew i t hﬂexible prices should be roughly half of the average degree
of exogenous price ﬁxity.
19and a prolonged output response.
Unsurprisingly, our stylized Fair Wage model cannot solve all the deﬁciencies of the benchmark
NNS model in the context of a money growth shock. While the introduction of real wage rigidity
reduces the response of both the aggregate price level and the rate of inﬂation, it does not come
close to matching the very sluggish (and for the inﬂation rate humpshaped) response found in the
data by, for example, Gali (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) or Nelson (1998).
Furthermore, our Fair Wage model does not succeed in generating a liquidity eﬀect (i.e. an initial
decrease of the nominal interest rate). This deﬁciency is intrinsically related to the counterfactual
behavior of inﬂation in the model. Because inﬂation jumps up on impact, the response of expected
inﬂation is also highest in the very ﬁrst period, thus swamping the modest negative response of the
real interest rate.31
IRFs with respect to a technology shock. Turning to Figure 2, the stronger ampliﬁcation
and persistence of output and other NIPA aggregates in the Fair Wage model is conﬁrmed for the
case of a technology shock (note that we report the diﬀerent IRFs over 50 quarters since the large
persistence of the technology shock by itself makes some of the deviations very long-lived). The
source of this internal propagation is again the real wage rigidity, which is apparent from the very
gradual response of the real wage and the accompanying larger response of employment in the Fair
Wage model.
Gali (1999) and more recently Francis and Ramey (2002) have emphasized that in the data,
employment decreases after a positive technology shock. Since their technology shock is permanent
rather than transitory and identiﬁed diﬀerently than ours, it would be inappropriate to directly
compare our IRFs with their results. Nevertheless, we interpret it as an encouraging sign that
the initial response of employment is negative not only for the NNS but also for our Fair Wage
economy despite the initially very small response of the real wage in the latter model. Also note
that by contrast to the Fair Wage model, the NNS model generates a sizable negative yet short-
lived decrease of the real wage upon impact. This appears counterfactual in light of the evidence
in Francis and Ramey (who report a positive real wage response in the data). Again, a word of
caution is in order because of the diﬀerent nature of the technology shock in their study and ours.
31As mentioned before, we acknowledge that the assumed monetary transmission mechanism is excessively sim-
plistic. Most central banks implement their policy decisions by targeting interest rates rather than by setting money
growth rates. Moreover, diﬀerent agents may be aﬀected diﬀerently by interest rate ﬂuctuations. Our conclusions re-
garding the liquidity eﬀect would potentially be altered by the introduction of a more realistic description of monetary
policy.
204.2 Unconditional second moments
Table 1 reports a host of unconditional second moments for U.S. data and contrasts them to
the corresponding values simulated from the NNS and the Fair Wage model.32 We extend our
comparison to the unconditional moments reported by Cooley and Hansen (1989) for a monetary
RBC model as well as Collard and De la Croix (2000) for their fair wage RBC economy.
Output volatility and persistence. The standard deviation of output in the NNS model
stands at 1.01 while it is 1.66 in the data and 1.79 in the Fair Wage model. This diﬀerence in
volatility forcefully highlights the already noted lack of internal propagation in the NNS benchmark
model. As is well known, the problem of weak ampliﬁcation would also apply to the case of the
monetary business cycle of Cooley and Hansen (1989) if it were not for their model’s indivisible
labor feature.
The Fair Wage model furthermore generates a ﬁrst-order autocorrelation for output of 0.92,
which is slightly larger than the value of 0.89 for the NNS model. Because the autocorrelation
for the NNS model is already surprisingly high, this actually represents a move away from the
autocorrelation in the data of 0.85. The former borrows from the estimated properties of Solow
residuals which have been widely questioned, however. We thus tend to view as positive the
capacity of our model to generate persistent reactions to the external shocks. Overall, we consider
the increased output volatility as one of the prime success stories of the fair wage construct.
Consumption and investment. The relative volatility and cross-correlation with output of
both consumption and investment are virtually the same for the Fair Wage and the NNS model.
While the relative standard deviation for consumption is slightly too low, investment is a bit too
volatile compared to the data. This last feature can be traced to the fact that, for the sake of
simplicity, we have refrained from incorporating costs of adjusting capital into our models.
Real wages and employment. The relative standard deviation of the real wage and its cross-
correlation with output is much too high in the NNS model while the cross-correlation between
employment and output is counterfactually low. By contrast, the (estimated) strong dependence of
current on past compensation levels in our Fair Wage economy enables ﬁrms to adjust labor input
without excessive variations in its price. This greatly reduces the sensitivity of the real wage and
simultaneously increases the responsiveness of employment to output ﬂuctuations. Furthermore,
the benchmark NNS economy as well as Cooley and Hansen’s monetary RBC model generate a
real wage that is too highly correlated with employment. Concurrently and very much analogous
to Collard and de la Croix’ fair wage RBC economy, our Fair Wage model comes much closer to
32Theoretical moments are computed from the model solutions using the spectral method described in King and
Watson (1996). We thank Bob King for kindly supplying this code. All moments are reported after Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁltering.
21the near-zero correlation between the real wage and employment observed in our data sample and
ﬁrst noticed by Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1938). We interpret this last result as an additional
important feature in favor of the fair wage labor market framework.
Aside from these positive results, there are also dimensions of the labor market along which our
stylized Fair Wage model performs unsatisfactorily: the real wage rate is not variable enough;33 the
standard deviation of employment is somewhat too high; and unemployment is excessively variable.
This last result is due to the fact that unemployment in our stylized economy is (counterfactually)
modeled as the mirror image of employment and that we calibrated its average rate to 5.63% rather
than the 10% chosen by Collard and de la Croix. Despite these deﬁciencies, we believe that the
dramatic change in real wage and employment dynamics illustrate well how the introduction of
eﬀort considerations may oﬀer a solution to the real wage and employment puzzle of the NNS and
RBC frameworks.
Real marginal cost. Notice that the smoothened real wage and the associated ability of ﬁrms
to adjust their labor input also stabilizes the rental price of capital in the Fair Wage model (relative
to the benchmark NNS). Altogether, the volatility of real marginal cost relative to output is much
reduced (from a ratio of 1.53 to 0.60), a fact that underlies the strength of the internal propagation
mechanism of our model.
The stabilizing impact of fair wage considerations on the real marginal cost contradicts Kiley’s
(1997) message that eﬃciency wage models are unlikely to achieve additional ampliﬁcation in
models with nominal price rigidities. His argument was derived from a very simple framework with
neither intertemporal wage comparisons in the eﬀort function nor variable capital. For real wages
to be acyclical under his assumptions, eﬀort had to be low when output and employment were high,
forcing real marginal cost to be highly volatile and procyclical.34 The evidence presented here is
much more favorable to the eﬃciency wage view. The intertemporal dimension of our fair wage
construct is key in explaining the diﬀerence. With the comparison between current and past wages
playing a dominant role in the determination of eﬀort, the link between acyclical real wages and
procyclical real marginal cost is severed.
Prices and Inﬂation. As discussed above, a direct consequence of a less elastic real marginal
cost dynamics is that adjusting ﬁrms change their prices to a smaller extent in response to a shock.
It is thus not unexpected that we observe a substantial decrease in the relative volatility of both
33When comparing the real wage moments of our Fair Wage model with the data, one should keep in mind that
diﬀerent measures of the real wage may lead to quite diﬀerent data moments. Furthermore, there may also be some
important subsample instability. For example, Cooley and Prescott (1995) report moments for two measures of the
real wage. The ﬁrst (from the Establishment Survey, 1964:1-1991:2) implies a relative standard deviation of 0.44.
By contrast, the second measure (from the National Income Accounts, 1954:1-1991:2) produces a relative standard
deviation of 0.32.
34Uhlig and Xu (1996) also develop an eﬃciency wage model with a static eﬀort function and countercyclical eﬀort.
22the aggregate price level (from a ratio of 2.13 to 1.19) and the inﬂation rate (from a ratio of 0.77 to
0.39) in the fair wage economy. The price level also becomes more countercyclical. While moments
for the aggregate price and inﬂation do not perfectly match respective data counterparts, they
deﬁnitely go in the right direction when compared to the NNS model. The same comparison is
also unfavorable to the monetary RBC model, where money is a ”pure veil” and price reactions are
excessive.
Finally, notice that Fair Wage model generates a slightly larger ﬁrst-order autocorrelation for
inﬂation than the NNS model. By contrast, the data display a much more moderate degree of
inﬂation persistence at business cycle frequencies. This ﬁnding is somewhat unexpected given the
empirical literature arguing that models incorporating Calvo pricing cannot generate suﬃcient in-
ﬂation persistence (see for example Fuhrer and Moore, 1995 or Fuhrer, 1997). Most of these studies
refer to overall and not cyclical inﬂation, however. In our view, this is not entirely appropriate
since the log-linearized inﬂation equation derived from the Calvo framework should be considered
as a cyclical description of price dynamics.
5 Robustness of results
As mentioned in the preceding discussion, it is important to evaluate the robustness of the models to
various parameter changes. We consider in turn the impact of assuming a smaller degree of nominal
price rigidity; of changing the calibration of the eﬀort function; and of altering the correlation
between the two driving processes. For space reasons, the discussion of the results will be limited
to a few key aspects.
5.1 Assuming a smaller degree of price rigidity
Figure 3 displays IRFs with respect to a 1% money shock for the case of a smaller average price
rigidity of two quarters (1−κ =0 .5) rather than the 3.3 quarters (1−κ =0 .3) of our baseline case.
The impact of this change is striking for the performance of the basic NNS model. Speciﬁcally, it
loses virtually all of its ability to produce any real eﬀects in response to the nominal shock (dotted
lines). The Fair Wage model, in contrast, remains capable of generating sizable and persistent
reactions for the diﬀerent real variables (solid lines). This result accords with the conclusion of
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan that with a small degree of price rigidity alone, the NNS all but
fails to generate the sort of business-cycle non-neutralities it was designed for. The result further
underlines the fact that the adjunction of real rigidities originating from gift exchange eﬃciency
wages is a powerful remedy to this problem.
Turning to the unconditional moments, Table 2 shows that the decrease in price rigidity also
worsens the performance of the NNS model on the labor market front. In particular, the relative
23volatility of employment falls from a ratio of 0.95 in the benchmark case to 0.43, which is much lower
than what is observed in the data. The relative volatility of the real wage and its cross-correlation
somewhat improve but the correlation between employment and real wages remains far too high.
Concurrently, the performance of the Fair Wage model along the labor market dimension remains
quite convincing. In fact, the performance even improves as the variability of employment decreases
to a more plausible ratio of 0.98 and the wage rate becomes more procyclical than in the baseline
case. At the same time, the correlation between employment and wages remains reasonably low.
Finally and as expected, prices and inﬂation become more variable for both the NNS and the
Fair Wage model (a move in the wrong direction). However, while the cyclicity of prices and
inﬂation improves in the fair wage economy, inﬂation becomes counter-cyclical in the case of the
NNS. In sum, these observations highlight that the Fair Wage model appears substantially more
robust than the basic NNS to changing assumptions about the degree of price rigidity.
5.2 Changing the calibration of the eﬀort function
How sensitive is our model to changes in the calibration of the eﬀort function? To answer this
question we report in Figures 4 and 6 the changes recorded for key second moments as the two
slope coeﬃcients take a range of conceivable values. We also display in Figures 5 and 7 the impulse
response functions obtained for speciﬁc alternative values of the two key parameters.
We start by testing the sensitivity of our results to a change in the elasticity of current compen-
sation with respect to labor market tightness (−φ2/(φ1 + φ3)). Figure 4 reports the results obtained
when varying this parameter over the range 0 to 1 (while keeping the elasticity with respect to the
past wage ﬁxed at 0.99). When eﬀort becomes more sensitive to the current labor market situation
(i.e. when variations in employment become relatively more important in motivating workers to
provide a gift above norm eﬀorts), ﬁrms are led to adjust real wages more rapidly (Figure 4, top
right panel) and thus, the degree of real wage rigidity decreases35. The increase in the variability of
real wages in turn leads to an increase in the relative variability of the real marginal cost (bottom
left panel). The impact of the more sensitive real marginal cost dynamics on the degree of integral
propagation is dramatic. The unconditional standard deviation of output falls (top left panel) and
the relative volatility of the price level and inﬂation increases. At the same time, the top left panel
of Figure 4 indicates that the ability of the fair wage model to generate a low correlation between
employment and wages is robust to this parameter change.
To illustrate further, Figure 5 shows IRFs with respect to a money growth shock when −φ2/(φ1 + φ3)=
0.3 2( t h ev a l u es e tb yC o l l a r da n dd el aC r o i x ) .T h eF a i rW a g em o d e li sn ol o n g e rc a p a b l eo fg e n -
erating ampliﬁed and long-lasting real responses to a 1% money growth shock. Its performance
in terms of generating sizable and persistent non-neutralities becomes even less satisfactory than
35We conjecture that this tendency would be less marked in a personal norm formulation of our model.
24the one of the NNS benchmark! These results highlight the crucial dependence of the Fair Wage
model on the calibrated elasticity of the real wage to employment.36 We stress, however, that our
point estimate for this parameter is only 0.035, with a 95% conﬁdence interval that is very tight,
ranging from 0.009 to 0.061. Assuming an elasticity anywhere higher than 0.1 thus appears largely
incompatible with the data under the fair wage hypothesis.
We now turn to the eﬀects of toning down the importance of the past compensation level in
the fair wage function. Figure 6 reports the impact of varying the elasticity of the real wage with
respect to past wages ( −φ4/(φ1 + φ3)) between 0 to 1 (while leaving the elasticity with respect
to employment at its estimated value of 0.035). Our model appears considerably more robust
along this dimension. The top-right and bottom left panel show that the relative volatility of
the real wage and consequently the relative volatility of marginal cost are little aﬀected by these
parameter changes (the scale of both graphs is an order of magnitude smaller than the scale of
the corresponding panels in Figure 4). As a consequence there is little eﬀect on the properties
of output, employment or prices and inﬂation (again beware that the scaling of the vertical axes
is adapted to the size of the recorded changes). The key unfortunate impact of decreasing this
elasticity from its point estimate of 0.99 to lower values is to increase the correlation between the
real wage and employment, thus making the model with elasticity of the past real wage smaller
than approximately 0.9 prone to the Dunlop-Tarshis critique.
For the purpose of illustration, Figure 7 provides the IRFs with respect to a money growth shock
for the case where the elasticity on past wages takes the arbitrarily extreme value of 0. Lowering
the dependence of current on past compensation actually renders the responses of real variables
with respect to a 1% monetary shock much more persistent. In particular, output returns to half
its deviation on impact only after roughly 50 quarters! To explain this result, note that, given
the near-zero elasticity of the fair wage to current employment, when the elasticity to past wage
changes tends toward zero, our model in fact converges toward an eﬃciency wage model where
eﬀort depends on the absolute real wage level rather than on relative wage comparisons. With the
adopted functional forms, the optimal wage policy consists in maintaining a constant real wage,
so as to elicit a constant eﬀort level. This explains the extremely low reaction of the real wage
recorded in Figure 7 and the increased persistence of the response of real variables to monetary
shocks. Recall however that, as before, this case is highly unlikely given the point estimate 0.99
obtained in Section 3.
5.3 Do assumptions about the driving processes matter?
It is widely accepted that basic business cycle properties of actual economies are to a large extent
independent of time and place. Given the large diﬀerences in monetary policies followed across
36Danthine and Donaldson (1990) made a parallel observation in a RBC context.
25countries or across time within a country, the presumption is that our models should not be overly
sensitive to alternative assumptions about the money shock process, and its correlation with tech-
nology shocks in particular. The last robustness test thus consists in examining the impact on our
Fair Wage model of arbitrarily setting the correlation between the technology innovation εA and
the money growth innovation εη to -0.5 and +0.5 (before H-P ﬁltering) rather than the estimated
value of 0.09. This leads to the following correlation between the two technology shock A and the
money growth rate η:
corrεA,εη 0.09 −0.5 0.5
corrA,η 0.05 −0.28 0.28
.
Table 3 reports the results of this exercise. Overall, the impact on real variables of the hypo-
thetical changes in the correlation of the innovations is modest. The only substantial change in
NIPA variables is a decrease in the standard deviation of output to 1.47% for the case when we
arbitrarily set the correlations between the innovations to -0.5. This decrease in overall internal
propagation can be attributed to the increase in relative volatility of real marginal cost from 0.60
to 0.87, which is mainly due to the increased variability of the rental rate of capital. For the case
of a positive correlation of 0.5 between the innovations, the standard deviation of output rises to
1.99%, which is somewhat excessive.
The labor market performance of the Fair Wage model deteriorates somewhat for the negative
correlation case: the relative volatility of employment increases to 1.41 and the real wage becomes
mildly countercyclical. By contrast, the Fair Wage model would appear under an even more favor-
able light if the innovations displayed a stronger positive correlation than what we estimated. The
relative volatility of employment decreases and the wage rate becomes more procyclical, bringing
the model economy closer to the data.
6 Comparison to alternative theories of the labor market
The reported results suggest that introducing real rigidities in the form of Fair Wages greatly
enhances the empirical properties of the NK framework. To place our contribution in perspective,
we close our analysis with a brief comparison of our model with three closely related contributions
incorporating alternative theories of the labor market into DSGE models with sticky prices. Two
important caveats apply, however. First, the models discussed below are not built on the same
structural base than ours and they are sometimes calibrated diﬀerently. This makes comparisons
of the eﬀects of diﬀerent labor market theories tentative, at best.37 Second, most of the studies
37For example, with the exception of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), none of the models under com-
parison allow for capital accumulation, thus omitting an important intertemporal link that may alter substantially
the dynamics of the model (see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2000).
26adopt a narrower perspective when discussing business cycle implications of their respective models.
Assessing the overall relative performance of these models vs. ours is thus not possible.
Most closely related to our paper is a study by Felices (2002), which investigates the properties
of a model economy where eﬃciency wages of the shirking variety are combined with a sticky price
hypothesis ` a la Calvo. Felices models consumer behavior using a family structure similar to ours (or
Alexopoulos, 2001) but with the added feature that the degree of income insurance among workers
is allowed to vary. He ﬁnds that with little income insurance (close to zero), shirking eﬃciency
wages substantially increase the persistence of output and inﬂation in response to a monetary shock
while leading to a low correlation between employment and the real wage. These results are not
robust, however, to an increase in the assumed level of risk sharing. Moreover, none of Felices’
simulations displays the hump-shaped response of output to a monetary shock that seems to be a
pervasive feature of the data and that our model successfully reproduces. The ability of our Fair
Wage model to induce a low correlation between employment and the real wage does not depend on
the degree of risk sharing among consumers. In fact, fairness considerations in our model lead to an
intertemporal link between real wages, which we have estimated to be quite high. This breaks the
contemporaneous relationship between employment and real wages (thus inducing real rigidity) —
independently of the risk sharing arrangement. At another level, we note that recent experimental
results and micro surveys appear to favor the fair wage hypothesis over the shirking hypothesis
as the more relevant explanation for eﬃciency wages (see Bewley, 2002, for a summary of this
argument).
Exogenously imposed staggered nominal wage contracts constitute another form of labor market
frictions that have recently been combined with sticky prices. Such contracts lead to more sluggish
wage dynamics and more persistent output ﬂuctuations in response to aggregate demand shocks.
In fact, work by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) shows that models with nominal wage
contracts alone (without sticky prices) do almost as well in this respect as models with both types
of rigidities.38 However, these results are conditional on a number of other important additional
features (habit persistence in consumption, adjustment cost in investment and variable capital
utilization). Parallel research by Rabanal (2001) highlights the fact that, in itself and absent a
large fraction of irrational backward-looking wage setters, the Calvo sticky wage framework implies
counterfactual cross-correlations between output and inﬂation, output and the real wage as well
as inﬂation and the real wage. Despite these reservations, we agree with Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans’ (2001) conclusion: the success of their reduced-form wage contracts in improving the
performance of the basic NK sticky price framework underlines the key role played by sluggish
wage adjustments in the U.S. business cycle and calls for a more structural modelling of the labor
market. Our Fair Wage model can be viewed as a ﬁrst response to this call.
38B´ enassy (2001) and Huang and Liu (2002) are other examples that come to similar conclusions.
27A third related contribution is by Walsh (2002) who introduces a labor market structure based
on a Mortensen-Pissarides (1994, 1999) matching function into a Calvo sticky price model. For
standard parameter values, he ﬁnds hump-shaped output and employment ﬂuctuations in response
to a monetary shock — similar to what our Fair Wage model delivers. These results are promising
and suggest that search and matching frictions may play an important role in explaining key features
of the cyclical labor market dynamics. At the same time, Walsh’s results are surprisingly sensitive
to the calibration of the share of surplus that a matched worker receives from his ﬁrm. This ﬁnding
clearly deserves additional scrutiny and highlights the need for completing search and matching
models with an explicit theory of wage determination.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have grafted an eﬃciency wage labor market friction onto a standard DSGE
model with sticky prices, thus complementing the nominal price rigidities, which are the hallmark
of recent New Keynesian models, with real wage rigidity. In particular, we have adopted a gift
exchange eﬃciency wage framework where comparisons between past and current wages constitute
an important determinant of eﬀort. While there exists well-documented micro-evidence that in-
tertemporal comparisons of wages play a signiﬁcant role in determining eﬀort, it is unclear from the
outset how important that role is in an aggregate representative agent setting. The estimates we
present in this paper indicate that if one is to make the proposed fair wage framework consistent
with aggregate data, comparisons between the current and last period’s real wage should actually
constitute the major determinant of eﬀort. Our framework thus oﬀers an explanation for why real
wages are not only rigid in the sense of preventing labor market clearance but also sluggish in the
sense of dynamic adjustment to shocks.
Despite its parsimonious nature, the performance of our Fair Wage model is very satisfactory
along two major dimensions at least. First, introducing fair wage considerations leads to substantial
improvements on the labor market front. Speciﬁcally, the variability and procyclicality of real
wages is markedly reduced while employment becomes more procyclical, thus better mimicking the
properties of the data. Furthermore, our model is successful in generating the near-zero correlation
between employment and real wages that is observed in the data and it provides a structural
explanation for the existence of unemployment. These ﬁndings are in line with the results by
Collard and de la Croix (2000) in the RBC context and conﬁrm that fair wage eﬃciency wages have
the potential to resolve the labor market puzzles that falsify many New Keynesian models of the
business cycle. Second, the eﬀort-induced real wage rigidity markedly smoothens the dynamics of
real marginal cost. As a result, the Fair Wage model displays much stronger internal propagation to
real and monetary shocks than the NNS benchmark — both in terms of ampliﬁcation and persistence.
28These important eﬀects persist even for very moderate degrees of nominal price rigidity. Our fair
wage addition thus oﬀers a solution to the well-known persistence problem of standard sticky price
models.
In sum, on almost all dimensions in which the Fair Wage model distinguishes itself from the
benchmark NNS model with sticky prices only, it appears to perform better. The Fair Wage model
also compares favorably with its main competitors although it is not possible at this stage to argue
for the deﬁnitive superiority of one approach over all the others. The Fair Wage model features a
strong intertemporal link for real wages, which is shown to substantially and robustly improve the
performance of the standard sticky price model. We take these results as a strong endorsement of
the adjunction of real rigidities in the form of eﬀort eﬃciency wages to complete the New Keynesian
synthesis.
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AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Data
All time series are quarterly, taken from the DRI Basic Economics database (formerly Citibase).
The choice of variables is very similar to the one by Stock and Watson (1998). We restrict our
statistical analysis to the sample 1953:2—2001:4 because the earlier post World War II years were
dominated by unusual occurences that our model is not designed to capture, such as the peacetime
conversion, the interest rate controls before the Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord in 1951 and the
Korean war. The following table gives the deﬁnition and a short description of the diﬀerent series
34(where the deﬁnition is given in actual DRI mnemonics):
Data
Variable Deﬁnition Description
y log(gdpq-gpbfq)-log(p16) real GDP (non-farm) per capita
c log(gcnq+gcsq)-log(p16) real per capita private consumption of non-durables and servics
i log(gifq)-log(p16) real per capita private ﬁxed investment (incl. residential)
n log(lpmhu)-log(p16) total hours (non-farm) per capita
u log(lhur) unemployment rate (in %) of all workers 16 and older
w log(lbcpu)-ln(gdc) real hourly compensation (non-farm)
R fygm3 3 months T-bill rate, in annual %
M log(fm1)-ln(p16) nominal money stock M1 per capita
P log(lbgdpu) implicit (non-farm) price deﬂator
π log(lbgdpu)-log(lbgdpu(-1)) gross inﬂation rate
Note that with the exception of the nominal interest rate R, all the data series are reported in
logarithms.
A.2 Stationarity transformation and detrending
The purpose of this appendix is twofold. First, it describes the normalization procedure that
makes it possible to map a model economy where real aggregates display zero steady state growth
with US data where both population and technology are growing. Second, it explains why linear
detrending of the variables used in the estimation of the fair wage function naturally follows from
this normalization procedure.
Consider the production function
Yt = AtF(Kt,X tNtet).
The variables Yt, Kt,a n dNt are real output, capital, and labor input as observed in the economy,
while et denotes the (unobserved) level of eﬀort. At represents total factor augmenting (Hicks-
neutral) technological progress, and Xt labor augmenting (Harrod-neutral) technological progress.
This latter component of productivity is assumed to evolve at a deterministic rate γx > 1; i.e.
Xt+1 = γxXt.
Likewise, we assume that the labor force or population Zt grows at a deterministic rate γz > 1; i.e.
Zt+1 = γzZt.
35These are standard assumptions.39
Under certain regularity conditions about preferences (see King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) for
details) — which are satisﬁed in our case — it is possible to transform this economy by scaling all
of the real aggregates by XtZt so that steady state growth is eliminated. Assuming F(·)t ob e
homogenous of degree 1, we obtain the production function of our model, equation (10)
yt = AtF(kt,n tet),
where yt ≡ Yt/XtZt, kt ≡ Kt/XtZt, nt ≡ Nt/Zt. The same normalization procedure turns the
original capital accumulation equation
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt − It
into the capital accumulation equation (5) of the model
γkt+1 =( 1− δ)kt − it,
where γ ≡ γxγz is the combined growth rate of technology and population.
Next, we show why linear detrending of the logarithms of the real wage and employment prior
to estimating the fair wage function is consistent with the normalization procedure just described.
Our starting point is a basic tenet of the modern business cycle literature: the labor share of
income WtNt/Yt ﬂuctuates around a constant mean over the post World War II period (see King
and Rebelo (2000) for a review). It follows that the unconditional mean of real wage growth equals

















Hence, for the real wage wt of our model to display zero steady state growth, the following deﬁnition
must hold: wt ≡ Wt/Xt; or equivalently in logarithms
logwt ≡ logWt − logXt =l o gWt − log(γt
xX0)=l o gWt − (logX0 + tlogγx).
To be consistent with this deﬁnition, we extract a linear trend from the logarithm of the observed
real wage to obtain the normalized wage series prior to estimating the fair wage function,
logwt =l o gWt − (−0.4981 + 0.0039)t.
39Most RBC models implement the stationarity transformation by only considering labor augmenting productivity.
Our normalization procedure is identical with the exception that we do not impose population to be constant (see
King and Rebelo (2000), footnote 21 for this point).
36The growth rate of labor augmenting technological progress equals γx =e x p ( 0 .0039) = 1.0039. We
apply the same detrending method to obtain the normalized employment series nt ≡ Nt/Zt that is
consistent with our model
lognt =l o gNt − (−7.0050 + 0.0010)t ,
which implies a population growth rate of γz =e x p ( 0 .001) = 1.0010. The combined growth rate of
labor augmenting technology and population is thus γ = γxγz =1 .0049.
37Figure 1:  Impulse response functions with respect to a 1% money growth rate shock for Fair Wage model (solid) and benchmark 
NNS model (dashed). 
 Figure 2:  Impulse response functions with respect to a 1% technology shock for Fair Wage model (solid) and benchmark NNS  
 model  (dashed). 
 
 Figure 3:  Impulse response functions with respect to a 1% money growth rate shock for Fair Wage model (solid) and benchmark  
  NNS model (dashed) for the case of smaller price rigidity (κ=0.5). 
 
 Figure 4:  Sensitivity of key second moments with respect to the slope coefficient on log[n(t)] of the fair wage function. 
 
                  Figure 5:  Impulse response functions with respect to a 1% money growth rate shock for Fair Wage model (solid) and benchmark  
  NNS model (dashed) for the case of a stronger dependence of the real wage on employment. 
 
 Figure 6:  Sensitivity of key second moments with respect to the slope coefficient on log[w(t-1)] of the fair wage function. 
 
  
Figure 7:  Impulse response functions with respect to a 1% money growth rate shock for Fair Wage model (solid) and benchmark  
  NNS model (dashed) for the case of independence of the real wage on last period’s real wage. 
 
    ababababab
c 0.57 0.69 0.38 0.78 0.40 0.76 0.36 0.72 0.26 0.79
i 2.95 0.88 3.68 0.97 3.67 0.97 3.29 0.97 3.33 0.99
n 0.94 0.87 1.18 0.89 0.95 0.52 0.77 0.98 0.74 0.86
u 7.43 -0.86 19.78 -0.89 6.66 -0.86
w 0.44 0.13 0.17 0.07 1.08 0.74 0.52 0.69
r
k 1.18 0.88 1.93 0.66
mc 0.60 0.10 1.53 0.20
R 0.71 0.37 0.28 0.45 0.48 0.44
P 0.67 -0.57 1.19 -0.33 2.13 -0.08 1.7 -0.27
π 0.30 0.11 0.39 0.28 0.77 0.33
A 0.49 0.59 0.88 0.75





All moments are Hodrick-Prescott filtered.
Data sources: 
(ii) Cooley and Hansen (1989)
(i) DRI Basic Economics; see Appendix A.1 for details
(iii) Collard and de la Croix (2000)
Table 1: Performance for baseline calibration
Monetary RBC (ii)
0.85
US data (i) Fair Wage model Fair Wage RBC (iii) Benchmark NNS
a. Standard deviation relative to output.






0.02 0.16 0.90 0.74 0.23
1.01 1.72 1.66 1.79ababab
c 0.57 0.69 0.37 0.91 0.40 0.94
i 2.95 0.88 3.45 0.99 3.32 0.99
n 0.94 0.87 0.98 0.95 0.43 0.66
u 7.43 -0.86 16.51 -0.95
w 0.44 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.85 0.63
r
k 0.99 0.92 1.12 0.70
mc 0.36 -0.13 0.86 -0.21
R 0.71 0.37 0.26 0.29 0.40 0.12
P 0.67 -0.57 1.35 -0.56 2.32 -0.35
π 0.30 0.11 0.52 0.02 1.00 -0.10
A 0.44 0.83 0.84 0.95





a. Standard deviation relative to output.
b. Contemporaneous correlation with output.
All moments are Hodrick-Prescott filtered.
Data sources:  (i) DRI Basic Economics; see Appendix A.1 for details








Fair Wage model with smaller 
price rigidity





Table 2: Robustness to smaller price rigidityababab
c 0.38 0.78 0.37 0.85 0.40 0.61
i 3.68 0.97 3.58 0.98 3.94 0.96
n 1.18 0.89 1.08 0.93 1.41 0.84
u 19.78 -0.89 18.10 -0.93 23.60 -0.84
w 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.20 -0.04
r
k 1.18 0.88 1.08 0.91 1.39 0.83
mc 0.60 0.10 0.46 0.04 0.87 0.20
R 0.28 0.45 0.20 0.53 0.41 0.43
P 1.19 -0.33 0.82 -0.21 1.84 -0.53
π 0.39 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.60 0.31
A 0.49 0.59 0.45 0.72 0.60 0.34





a. Standard deviation relative to output.
b. Contemporaneous correlation with output.
All moments are Hodrick-Prescott filtered.
Data sources:  (i) DRI Basic Economics; see Appendix A.1 for details
Table 3: Robustness to alternative correlations between innovations
0.16
0.92
Baseline Fair Wage Negative correlation Positive correlation
1.99
0.15
0.67
0.91
0.67
0.93
0.67
corr(εA,εη)=0.09 corr(εA,εη)=0.50 corr(εA,εη)=-0.50
0.16
1.79 1.47